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Diverse Programming vs. Community
Standards: The Constitutionality of
Municipal Censorship of Leased Access
Cable
In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Communications Policy Act
to provide a national scheme for the regulation of cable television.
Sections 531 and 532 of the Cable Act require cable operators to
provide "leased access" to programmers who are unaffiliated with
the cable operator. The cable operator has no editorial control
over the programs. Instead, section 532(h) of the Act allows the
franchising authority to restrict offensive programming. The sec-
tion, however, has two serious flaws. First, the section's language
ostensibly violates the overbreadth doctrine. Second, the section
lacks procedures necessary to safeguard constitutionally protected
expression. The section, therefore, arguably violates the first
amendment.
Cable television access channels provide opportunities for expres-
sion unavailable in other media. Access channels are generally of
four types: public, educational, government, and leased access. Pub-
lic access channels are the "video equivalent to the speaker's soap
box or . . .the printed leaflet."' Educational and government access
channels bring the local schools and government into the home.
Leased access channels provide channel capacity for program suppli-
ers other than the cable operator.
While cable operators have economic incentives to provide diverse
programming to attract subscribers, they have little incentive to pro-
vide programming capacity for others. This is especially true if the
proposed programming conflicts with the cable operator's social,
moral, or political views, or competes with the operator's current
programming. To realize the opportunities available through access
1. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4655 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
2. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 48, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
channels, Congress attempted to provide such incentive externally by
establishing a "clear and comprehensive scheme for commercial ac-
cess" 3 in the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984" ("Cable
Act"). In reality, the provisions create considerable uncertainty for
both prospective access users5 and franchising authorities.6 This
Comment explores one of the most problematic of the 1984 leased
access provisions, section 532(h).7
Section 532(h) gives a franchising body authority to prohibit or
condition programming which, in its view, is "obscene, or is in con-
flict with community standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Constitution.",, The pur-
pose of this provision is questionable given Congress' stated goal of
encouraging the "widest possible diversity of information sources." ' ,
Section 532 widens programming diversity by mandating leased ac-
cess channels,' 0 while section 532(h) restricts diversity by granting
franchising authorities extensive power to regulate content on
channels.
This Comment addresses the substantive and procedural flaws of
section 532(h). Part I places the Cable Act in historical perspective,
discussing the various attempts to implement and regulate access
programming. Part II interprets the scope of the statutory language,
"obscene . . .lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or .. .otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution," within the constraints of statutory
construction and the first amendment. Part III discusses the proce-
ADMIN. NEWS 4685.
3. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN, NEWS 4668. The Cable Act uses the term "commercial access" rather than the
traditional term, "leased access." 47 U.S.C. § 532 (Supp. I 1985).
4. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(pertinent sections codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521, 522, 531-533, 541-547, 551-559, 601-
611 (Supp. III 1985)).
5. Winer, The Signal Cable Sends, Part 11 - Interference From the Indecency
Case?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 510 (1987); see infra text accompanying notes 161-71.
6. In most cases, the franchising authority is the municipality. For an explanation
of the basis for municipality regulation of cable television, see infra text accompanying
notes 36-41.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985).
Any cable service offered pursuant to this section shall not be provided, or shall
be provided subject to conditions, if such cable service in the judgment of the
franchising authority is obscene, or is in conflict with community standards in
that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution of the United States.
Id.
8. Id. The language of the statute seems to indicate that material which is lewd,
lascivious, filthy or indecent, but which falls short of being obscene, is unprotected by the
Constitution. This is not the case. Only obscenity is wholly unprotected by the Constitu-
tion. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). This Comment will address the extent
of protection given broadcast indecency. See infra notes 71-127 and accompanying text.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (Supp. III 1985).
10. Id. § 532(b).
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dural defects of section 532(h). Finally, this Comment concludes
that the substantive and procedural flaws of section 532(h) render it
unconstitutional, and therefore useless as a guide to the franchising
authority, and provides practical recommendations for legislating a
replacement provision.
I. SECTION 532 IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The earliest cable television, called "Community Antenna Televi-
sion" (CATV), 11 began as a means to improve local reception in
mountainous areas.' 2 Since the new industry served only small towns
which would not otherwise receive broadcast stations, the broadcast
industry had few complaints.' 3 Therefore, both federal and state gov-
ernments were slow to assert jurisdiction over the budding indus-
try. 14 However, as improvements in technology allowed the cable sys-
tems to expand into metropolitan areas, broadcasters demanded
regulation of this new competition. 15
At first, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) doubted
its power to regulate cablecasters.16 Under the Communications Act
of 1934, the FCC had authority to regulate "all interstate and for-
eign communication by wire or radio."' 7 Since the Act predated
cable television,' 8 it provided no direct authority for FCC regulation
of cable. However, in 1968 the Supreme Court held that the FCC
had authority to regulate cable to the extent that such regulation
was "reasonably ancillary" to FCC regulation of broadcast television
11. I. STEIN, CABLE TELEVISION HANDBOOK AND FORMS 1-6 (1985).
12. P. PARSONS, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12 (1987). "One
big antenna could provide a clear signal for an entire town." I. STEIN, supra note 11, at
1-7.
13. P. PARSONS, supra note 12, at 13.
14. I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 1-10.
15. P. PARSONS, supra note 12, at 13. The cable systems offered the broadcast
audience expanded channel choice, broadcast programming imported from other cities,
new cable programming uninterrupted by commercials, and national programming of
movies, sports, news and specialty programs for children, seniors and minorities. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. In contrast, broadcast television's limited offerings provided
little variety to retain their audiences. The broadcasters therefore turned to the govern-
ment for protection.
16. Frontier Broadcasting v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (refusing to assert ju-
risdiction over cable when 13 broadcasters requested FCC regulation of cable on the
grounds that cable transmission of distant programming threatened the economic viabil-
ity of broadcasters).
17. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1982).
18. The first nonprofit cable system began in Astoria, Oregon in 1947, and the first
commercial system started in Mahony and Lansford, Pennsylvania in 1949. I. STEIN,
supra note 11, at 1-6; P. PARSONS, supra note 12, at 10.
under the Communications Act. 19
The FCC immediately began to examine the kinds of regulations
it could adopt under the ruling.2 0 Its focus quickly shifted from pro-
tecting the broadcast industry to developing cable technology for the
benefit of the public.2 The Supreme Court endorsed this new focus
by upholding regulations requiring cable systems to produce a signif-
icant amount of local programs.22 In 1972 the FCC promulgated a
comprehensive set of cable regulations covering signal carriage, im-
portation, program exclusivity, channel capacity, technical stan-
dards, state and local regulation, and certificates of compliance.2 3 In
addition, the FCC mandated that access channels satisfy the "in-
creasing .need for channels for community expression."2 4 The new
rules required cable operators to provide free channels for public,
government, and educational access, with the remaining capacity
available for leased access.25
Finding the 1972 regulations unworkable,2 6 the FCC rewrote the
access rules in 1976. The 1976 rules applied to cable systems with
over 3500 subscribers.2 7 The FCC required that these systems pro-
vide channels for public, educational, government, and leased ac-
cess. 8 Until demand was sufficient, all access programing could
19. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (uphold-
ing FCC regulations requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast television signals,
forbidding duplication of local broadcast programming, and restricting transmission of
distant signals to only the 100 largest markets).
20. DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION 6 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977).
21. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 417
(1968). The FCC was now faced with the "broad question of how to obtain, consistent
with the public interest standard of the Communications Act, the full benefits of develop-
ing communications technology for the public with particular immediate reference to
CATV technology." Id.
22. The Court upheld an FCC regulation requiring that "'no CATV system hav-
ing 3500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast station
unless the system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting
and has available facilities for local production and presentation of programs other than
automated services.'" United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54
(quoting 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a)), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 898 (1972). Although the Court
upheld the regulation, the FCC abandoned the rule in 1974. S. RIVKIN, A NEW GUIDE
TO FEDERAL CABLE TELEVISION REGULATIONS 304-05, n.10 (1978).
23. I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 1-20.
24. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 191 (1972).
25. I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 15-3 to 15-4.
26. Id. at 15-4. The new regulations made expansion of a cable system more
costly. P. PARSONS, supra note 12, at 20. These increased costs, compounded by a reces-
sive economy which hurt industry revenues and investment, severely inhibited the growth
of the industry. I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 1-21. In addition, the regulations required
extensive, detailed supervision, making full enforcement difficult if not impossible. Besen
& Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 98
(1981). Moreover, the general disfavor with federal regulation during this period assured
the end of these comprehensive regulations. Id.
27. Report and Order, Cable TV Capacity and Access Requirements, 59 F.C.C.2d
294, 297 (1976).
28. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(a) (1977) (repealed 1980).
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share one or more channels. 29 Cable operators had no editorial con-
trol over access programming, except to prohibit lottery information,
commercial matter, obscenity, and indecency.30 In addition, cable
operators were to provide time on the public and leased access chan-
nels on a first come, nondiscriminatory basis
1.3
In 1979 the Supreme Court held that the FCC had exceeded its
"reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction in promulgating the 1976 regula-
tions, and thus the regulations were voided. 32 The Court reasoned
that the 1976 regulations relegated cable systems to common-carrier
status in violation of section 3(h) of the Communications Act of
1934.7 In response to this decision, the FCC repealed many of the
1976 regulations,34 leaving cable regulation in the hands of state and
local governments.35
Unlike broadcasting, cable television has always been under the
dual jurisdiction of the FCC and local authorities. This dual jurisdic-
tion arises from the way programing is transmitted on cable systems.
Cable systems transmit programming by electronic impulses through
a coaxial cable 6 placed on utility poles, under public streets, or
through private property.3 7 Broadcasting, in contrast, radiates elec-
tromagnetic energy through the air. s Thus, both cable operators and
broadcasters must get FCC approval to transmit television program-
ing.39 However, cable operators must obtain an easement from the
municipality to erect utility poles and lay cables underneath the
streets.4 0
The necessary easement, called a "franchise," gave the municipal-
ity power over cablecasters which they did not have over other media
29. 47 C.F.R. § 76.254(b) (1977) (repealed 1980).
30. 47 C.F.R. § 76.25(b),(d)(1977) (repealed 1980).
31. 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(d)(1),(3)(1977) (repealed 1980).
32. F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1979).
33. Id. Section 3(h) states in pertinent part, "a person engaged in ... broadcast-
ing shall not ... be deemed a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)(1982).
34. Cable Television Channel Capacity and Access Requirements, 83 F.C.C.2d
147 (1980).
35. Comment, Public Access to Cable Television, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1009, 1028
(1982).
36. Comment, Expanding the Scarcity Rationale: The Constitutionality of Public
Access Requirements in Cable Franchise Agreements, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 305, 307
(1986).
37. 1. STEIN, supra note 11, at 10-1.
38. Comment, Cable Television: The Constitutional Limitations of Local Govern-
ment Control, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 181, 182-83 (1984).
39. Id. at 184; I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 10-1.
40. Comment, supra note 38, at 184; I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 10-1.
providers.4 This power, combined with the lack of federal regula-
tion, left municipalities free to promulgate their own access regula-
tions.42 With the demand for cable service increasing and competi-
tion for cable franchises tightening, cable companies were willing to
comply with local regulations demanding access channels.13 The in-
crease in local regulation created problenis with national uniformity,
Congress, fearing inconsistent regulation, responded by enacting the
1984 Cable Communications Policy Act.
4
1
The Cable Act contains two sections of access rules. Section 531
gives the franchising body authority to designate certain channel ca-
pacity for public, educational, or government access4" and allows lo-
cal regulation of the channels.46 Section 532 addresses leased ac-
cess47 and is the only section of the Cable Act which states its own
purpose: "to assure that the widest possible diversity of information
sources are [sic] made available to the public from cable systems in
a manner consistent with growth and development of cable sys-
tems. ' 48 Section 532(b) requires cable operators to provide channel
capacity for leased access channels based on their total number of
activated channels.49 These channels are reserved for use by persons
unaffiliated with the cable operator.5" The cable operator cannot ex-
ercise any editorial control over program content.51 Section 532(c)
allows the operator to consider content only when establishing a rea-
sonable price for use. 2 Other subsections address the promulgation
41. I. STEIN, supra note 11, at 10-1.
42. Comment, supra note 35, at 1028-29.
43. Id.
44. Congress described the purpose of the act as follows: "[To] establish a national
policy concerning cable communications [and to] establish guidelines for the exercise of
Federal, State, and local authority with respect to the regulation of cable systems." 47
U.S.C. § 521(1), (3)(Supp. III 1985).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 531(b)(Supp. III 1985). "A franchising authority may in its re-
quest for proposals require as part of a franchise . . . that channel capacity be designed
for public, educational, or governmental use .... " Id.
46. 47 U.S.C. § 531 (Supp. III 1985).
47. Id. § 532.
48. Id. § 532(a).
49. Id. § 532(b).
50. Id. § 532(b)(1). The Cable Act does not define the term "unaffiliated." How-
ever, to fully realize the goal of promoting diverse programming sources, it must be read
broadly to forbid any economic relationship between the cable provider and the program-
mer, other than, of course, the commercial use agreement. Meyerson, The Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984: A Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REV.
543, 592 n.290 (1985).
51. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
52. Id. Section 532(c) codifies an important departure from the mandatory access
requirements struck down in F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
Whereas the previous access regulations mandated nondiscriminatory access channels,
sections 532(c)(2) and 532(c)(3) allow the cable operator to set rates, terms and condi-
tions based on the nature of the programming. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 51,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1688. If cable operators were
required to charge one nondiscriminatory rate, they would be forced to set that rate at
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and violation of the leased access rules.5
The remainder of this Comment will focus on section 532(h),
which provides:
Any cable service offered pursuant to this section shall not be provided, or
shall be provided subject to conditions, if such cable service in the judgment
of the franchising authority is obscene, or is in conflict with community
standards in that it is lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution of the United States.54
A franchising authority's control of the content of leased access pro-
grams is governed by this provision. To determine the extent of that
control, the franchising authority must understand the scope of "ob-
scene . . . lewd, lascivious, filthy, . . . indecent or . . . otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution.
55
II. UNDERSTANDING THE SCOPE OF "OBSCENE .. .LEWD,
LASCIVIOUS, FILTHY, OR INDECENT"
The string of adjectives, "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or inde-
cent," presents an ambiguous and possibly unconstitutional standard
for franchising authorities. Congress has used these five adjectives in
other statutes56 in an attempt to regulate communications referring
to sexual or excretory activities which may offend audiences. The
courts have typically interpreted such statutes to prohibit only ob-
scene matter. 57 Recently, the Supreme Court in F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Foundation58 interpreted 18 U.S.C. section 146459 to restrict both
the average for all types of programming. Programming with a higher fair market price
would flood the channels, while programming with a lower fair market price could not
afford access. Thus, the legislature justifies the cable operator's consideration of the na-
ture of the programming in setting the rates, terms and conditions. The legislative history
states that, in order to set a price based on the nature of the programming, it is "obvi-
ously necessary" that the cable operator consider the type of programming. Id. Thus, it
follows that the cable operator must be allowed to consider the content of the program-
ming, but only to set a reasonable price, not to determine the terms or conditions. Id.
The legislative history, therefore, seems to indicate that content is only relevant to the
extent that it dictates the nature of the programming upon which rates are based. Any
other relevance the legislature finds between content and price, however, is unclear and is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
53. 47 U.S.C. § 532(d)-(g) (Supp. III 1985).
54. Id. § 532(h).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462, 1465 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 135-51.
58. 438 U.S. 726 (1977). See infra text accompanying notes 152-59.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988). "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both." Id.
obscene and indecent broadcasting. It is possible that the Court
might apply Pacifica to section 532(h) based on the similarities be-
tween cable and broadcasting.60 Indeed, without such an interpreta-
tion, section 532(h) may violate the overbreadth doctrine.61
A. An Introduction to the Overbreadth Doctrine
A statute is facially void if it not only controls activities which are
constitutionally unprotected, but also "sweeps within its ambit" ar-
eas of protected activity.6 2 Because many laws potentially apply to
protected activity, a law is "void for overbreadth" only when the pro-
tected activity constitutes a significant portion of the statute's target
and cannot otherwise be severed from the statute's constitutional ap-
plications in a single proceeding." While this doctrine applies to any
statute, the requirement of a single severance, rather than the usual
case-by-case approach to statutory construction, is critical in the sen-
sitive area of first amendment protection. Typically, a particular ap-
plication of a statute is struck down only when challenged as ap-
plied.64 Meanwhile, the prospect of legal battles will undoubtedly
discourage the activity in question. While this may be an acceptable
risk in many areas of the law, the discouragement of protected ex-
pression is intolerable. This "chilling effect" upon protected expres-
sion necessitates the invalidation of such laws.
In recent years, the Court has demonstrated an increased reluc-
tance to invalidate entire statutes under the overbreadth doctrine.
Instead, the Court has shown a willingness to reconstruct challenged
statutes in order to cure constitutional defects. 65 The degree to which
the Court can reconstruct federal statutes is somewhat limited, how-
60. See infra text accompanying notes 78-127.
61. See generally, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 844 (1970); Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
62. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940) (statute banning picketing held
to be void for overbreadth because it forbade peaceful picketing which is constitutionally
protected).
63. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022 (2d ed. 1988). Where the
protected activity is not a significant part of the statute's target, the law may stand al-
though application to the protected activity is not allowed.
64. See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961) (holding that the Sherman Act did not prohibit concerted lobbying
efforts); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a trespass ordinance did
not prohibit dissemination of religious material in company town).
65. L. TRIBE, supra note 63, at 1026-27. The traditional treatment of "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent" provides an apt illustration of this tendency. Rather
than invalidate the statutes for referring to protected expression, the Courts interpreted
the statutes to ban only unprotected obscenity. See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188, 195 (1977) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1461); see also infra text accompanying
notes 135-51. In another obscenity case, the Court supplied the lacking procedural safe-
guards in a statute providing for the seizure of obscene material imported into the United
States. United States v, Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 368-75 (1971) (inter-
preting 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)); see infra text accompanying notes 192-200.
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ever, by the separation of powers doctrine.6 At some point, judicial
efforts at reconstruction become "relegislation," a job reserved for
Congress. This problem is further complicated because the alterna-
tive to reconstruction is facial invalidation, which presents practical
problems of its own. Once a statute is invalidated, the legislature
must work to enact a valid replacement, leaving "unprotected and
presumably harmful speech . . . wholly unregulated" in the in-
terim."7 Moreover, in light of the legislature's vulnerability to politi-
cal pressures, it is doubtful that judicial invalidation of repressive
statutes will substantially increase legislative sensitivity to free
speech when the public demands censorship. 8 Faced with these al-
ternatives, it behooves the Court to strive for a constitutional con-
struction of the statute. However, the Court must respect the deli-
cate balance between proper judicial functions and "relegislation."
B. The Constitutional Limits For Regulation Of Cable Content
A constitutional construction of section 532(h) requires an exami-
nation of the extent to which sexually offensive material on cable
television is protected. The ability of the franchising authority to
regulate cable obscenity is not questioned. "This much has been cat-
egorically settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected
by the First Amendment." 69 In Miller v. California, the Court ex-
pounded a definition of obscenity which marked the outer limits of
constitutional protection afforded all media. 0 This standard re-
66. Monaghan, supra note 61, at 30.
67. Id. at 32.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); see also Kois v. Wisconsin, 408
U.S. 229 (1972); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476 (1956).
70. 413 U.S. at 24. The Miller obscenity test asks:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual con-
duct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citation omitted).
The Court had great trouble defining obscenity. Roth v. United States first defined
obscenity as "deal[ing] with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." 354 U.S.
476, 487 (1956). A decade later, the Court severely limited Roth by requiring, in addi-
tion, that the material "be utterly without redeeming social value." Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966). In spite of the formulation, no majority could agree
upon a standard by which to judge alleged obscenity. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22. One Justice
expressed his frustration with defining the term: "I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand descrip-
mained intact until F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation.7
1. Applying Pacifica to Cable
Pacifica arose out of a 2:00 p.m. broadcast of a George Carlin
monologue entitled "Filthy Words.""2 A father who had heard the
broadcast while driving with his son complained. The FCC could
consider that incident, and any others, when the time came to renew
Pacifica's license. Pacifica challenged FCC authority to regulate a
radio broadcast that was indecent but not obscene. The court found
that the unique characteristics of broadcasting made the particular
regulation acceptable.73 In emphasizing the narrowness of its hold-
ing, the Court noted that "differences between radio, television, and
perhaps closed-circuit transmissions, may also be relevant" in decid-
ing the extent of constitutional protection afforded a medium.74 The
narrowness of Pacifica has since been reaffirmed as the Court has
refused to apply the same rationales to indecency regulations on un-
solicited mail7" and "dial-a-porn. '76
The Court has long held that "[e]ach medium of expression, of
course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards
suited to it."' 77 Therefore, to determine the applicability of Pacifica
to cable television, a comparison must be made between cable and
broadcasting. Lower federal courts making this comparison have
consistently distinguished the two media, finding the Pacifica ratio-
nales inapplicable to cable.78
tion. . . . But I know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring). This led to the Redrup approach of reversing convictions where
at least five members found the material to be protected under whatever personal test
they applied. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967). By the time Miller was de-
cided, 31 cases had been resolved that way. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 n.3.
71. 438 U.S. 726 (1977).
72. Id. at 729.
73. Id. at 748.
74. Id. at 750. The Court did not indicate any particular differences in the media
which it might find relevant. However, the Court recognized that some differences did
exist which could vary the level of appropriate constitutional protection. The Court also
emphasized that the time of day, content of the program, and composition of the audi-
ence were important considerations. Id. This aspect of the holding is discussed later in
this Comment. See infra text accompanying notes 177-83.
75. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (statutory ban on
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives violates first amendment).
76. Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989)
(statutory ban on indecent telephone messages violates the first amendment).
77. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (city
plays); see also Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (billboards); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (broadcasting).
78. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (Miami ordinance regulating
indecent and obscene cable television); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
611 F. Supp. 1099 (D.C. Utah 1985) (holding Utah Cable Television Programming De-
cency Act to be unconstitutionally overbroad and vague), afT d sub nom. Jones v. Wilkin-
son, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curium), afld 480 U.S. 926 (1987); Community
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2. The "Unique" Pervasiveness of Broadcasting
The Pacifica Court focused on two "unique" characteristics of
broadcasting in limiting the reach of constitutional protection: perva-
siveness and accessibility to children. "First, the broadcast media
have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. ''7 Although one court interpreted this pervasiveness to
refer to the "ever-presen[ce]" of broadcast transmissions in the air,80
the holding seems to rest more on the idea that "material presented
over the airwaves confronts the citizen .. . in the privacy of the
home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs
the First Amendment rights of an intruder."'" To define pervasive-
ness literally would support content regulation of a medium solely
because of its wide public acceptance. 82 This approach seems contra-
dictory since wide acceptance implies public approval, indicating
that content regulation is unnecessary.
In Pacifica, the Court characterized the broadcast listener as a
member of a captive audience who is subjected to an unwanted in-
trusion into the privacy of his home.8' Lower federal courts have dis-
tinguished cable television from this characterization of broadcasting
by focusing on the subscription aspect of cable as an invitation into
the home.84 The subscriber requests cable service, chooses the scope
of channels, pays for it on a monthly basis, and may cancel it at any
time. The subscriber may also change to one of the many other,
channels offered by cable or simply turn off the set.85
Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Utah 1982) (striking
down municipal ordinance banning distribution of pornography or indecency); Home Box
Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp. 987 (C.D. Utah 1982) (striking down Utah stat-
ute banning distribution of pornographic or indecent material over wire or cable); see
also infra text accompanying note 84.
79. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1977).
80. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1169.
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S.-at 748.
82. G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND & J. MERCURIO, 'CABLESPEECH' THE CASE FOR
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 34 n.15 (1983). But see Wardle, Cable Comes of Age:
A Constitutional Analysis of the Regulation of "Indecent" Cable Television Program-
ming, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 621, 650 (1986).
83. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
84. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420; Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. at 1113-14 n.76; Roy City,
555 F. Supp. at 1168; Home Box Office, 531 F. Supp. at 1001-02.
85. Admittedly, the option of turning the receiver (television set or radio) off is
identical in broadcast and cable. Furthermore, the Court seems to have rejected this
option. "To say that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he
hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after
the first blow." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49. Although an audience offended by dialogue
in a public setting must turn away, the same does not hold true within the sanctity of the
Advocates seeking similar treatment of cable and broadcasting
point to the lack of viewer choice in both media. 86 "Unlike purchas-
ers of books, magazines or video cassettes who obtain only the spe-
cific material they desire, television viewers are confronted with pro-
gramming selected for them by others. '87 This argument does not
carry much weight. The same reasoning would support an argument
to reduce the protection of newspapers and magazines. Each issue
brings to the subscriber a group of articles chosen by the publisher,
not by the subscriber. The subscriber, like the cable viewer, may
pick and choose which article to read (or program to watch) and
cancel the subscription if desired.88 However, the print media has
historically received the greatest constitutional protection.8 9 In light
of the subscription aspect of cable and the extensive selection of
channels, cable viewers are not the captive audience that Pacifica
found radio listeners to be.
3. The Protection of Children
The Pacifica Court also based its holding on the unique accessibil-
ity of broadcasting to children, "even those too young to read." 90
The Court traditionally has given children special first amendment
treatment. For example, the Court has upheld the restriction of a
minor's access to sexually explicit magazines which were not ob-
scene. 91 More recently, the Court upheld a state prohibition on the
home. Id. at 749 n.27.
86. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 82, at 650.
87. Id.
88. See Roy City, 555 F. Supp. at 1172.
89. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)
(striking down a Florida statute giving political candidates a right to reply to criticism
printed in newspaper). This special treatment arises out of a traditional belief that sepa-
rating government and the press is the best way to fulfill the "national commitment to
the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open,"
Becker, Electronic Publishing: First Amendment Issues in the Twenty-First Century, 13
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 832 n.136 (1985) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). The validity of this long-standing American tradition is be-
yond the scope of this Comment, but is discussed at length in Anderson, The Origins of
the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guar-
antee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press A Redundancy: What
Does It Add To Freedom Of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); Lewis, A Preferred
Position for Journalism?, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595 (1979); see also First National Bank
v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring), reh. denied, 438 U.S. 907
(1978).
90. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.
91. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, reh. denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968).
First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our society. . . .[P]arents and others ...
who have this primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the
support of laws designed to aid discharge of that responsibility. . . .Moreover,
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distribution of material depicting sexual performances of children
under sixteen years of age, even though the performances were not
necessarily obscene.92 The Court also let stand a city ordinance
prohibiting adult theaters within 1000 feet of any residential zone,
family dwelling, church, or park as well as within one mile of any
school.9 This concern about the availability of sexually explicit pro-
gramming to children is reflected in the legislative history of the
Cable Act. 4
However, the Court will not go as far in protecting children as to
"reduce the adult population. . . to reading. . . only what is fit for
children."9 5 The Pacifica Court noted that the FCC did not "reduce
adults to hearing only what is fit for children" because adults could
find the identical monologue on tapes, records, or in nightclubs.
96
This limitation is apparent in the Court's decisions since Pacifica.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,91 the Court held that a
statute98 which prohibited the mailing of unsolicited advertisements
for contraceptive devices was unconsitutional. 99 The Court noted
that parents already exercise considerable control over their mail
once it is received. 100 Thus, the "receipt of mail is far less intrusive
and uncontrollable" than the radio broadcast in Pacifica.101
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., °2 the pro-
tection of children argument failed to save a statute103 banning inde-
the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from
purchasing the magazines for their children [or for themselves].
Id.
92. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
93. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (noting that the ordi-
nance left over 5% of the city's land area for adult theater sites), reh. denied, 475 U.S.
1132 (1986).
94. HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4706. "The Committee is extremely concerned with the dissemination of
programming containing explicit sexual material which might be offensive to many cable
subscribers. The Committee is particularly concerned about the availability of such pro-
gramming to child viewers." Id.
95. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (striking down statute prohibit-
ing distribution of any publication containing obscene language which corrupts the
morals of youth).
96. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
97. 463 U.S. 60 (1983); see supra note 75.
98. 39 U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (1982).
99. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 75.
100. Id. at 73.
101. Id. at 74.
102. 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
103. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
cent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages.104
The Court felt that credit card rules, access codes, and scrambling
rules, already implemented by the FCC, sufficiently protected chil-
dren from dial-a-porn without banning the messages entirely. 10 In
both Bolger and Sable Communications, the regulation of indecent
material far exceeded that which was necessary to protect minors,
and limited adults to material fit for children. The Court, therefore,
found the regulations in question to be unconstitutional.
Similarly, regulation of cable indecency exceeds the goal of pro-
tecting children and restricts adults to material fit for children. Par-
ents have greater control over cable television than over broadcast
radio and television. Parents order cable service, choose the scope of
service, and may cancel at any time. Parental lock boxes' 06 and pro-
gram guides provide additional control. While program guides are
also available for broadcast television, they are not available for
broadcast 'radio, the medium at issue in Pacifica.'07 Nonetheless,
where there are such opportunities for parental control, regulation
replaces parental authority, allowing government, rather than par-
ents, to decide what children may view. 0 8 Such regulation cannot be
justified on the basis of protecting children. Appropriate governmen-
tal intervention aids parents in rearing their children. It does not
override parental decisions.
In addition, the programs on leased access, unlike the Carlin mon-
ologue in Pacifica, are probably unavailable anywhere else. This is
an important distinction. A primary rationale behind mandatory
leased access channels is to provide a forum otherwise not available.
To now limit that forum would negate the purpose of those channels
and unacceptably restrict adult viewing.
4. Physical Scarcity
Although 'the Pacifica Court did not rely on "physical scarcity" as
a basis for its holding, the concept is one of the rationales supporting
broadcast regulation.'0 9 Public airwaves can only accommodate a
104. Sable Communications, 109 S. Ct. at 2839.
105. Id. at 2838 n.10.
106. Section 544(d)(2)(A) provides: "In order to restrict the viewing of program-
ming which is obscene or indecent, upon the request of a subscriber, a cable operator
shall provide (by sale or lease) a device by which the subscriber can prohibit viewing of a
particular cable service during periods selected by that subscriber." 47 U.S.C. §
544(d)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1985). The term "lock box" is used in the legislative history
concerning this provision. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 70, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4707.
107. This may be one of the differences between radio and television which sup-
ports different constitutional treatment. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
108. G. SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 47-48.
109. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969)
(imposing broadcast fairness doctrine requiring broadcaster to provide reply time to poli-
506
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limited number of broadcasters. This arguably justifies some regula-
tion to ensure that broadcasters use the airwaves in a manner consis-
tent with public interest.' °
The constitutionality of mandatory access provisions requires simi-
lar justification. Such provisions force cable operators to provide ac-
cess to certain users. This fact necessarily limits the ability of a
cable operator to select programming. Arguably, such a limitation
infringes cable operators' first amendment rights.' When reviewing
the FCC's first attempt to enact mandatory access regulations," 2 the
Eighth Circuit suggested that there may be first amendment
problems with mandatory access. 1 3 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
questioned, but did not resolve, whether sections 531 and 532 vio-
lated the First Amendment." 4 When promulgating sections 531 and
532, Congress was aware of first amendment challenges to
mandatory access provisions. However, Congress found that sections
531 and 532 were "consistent with and further the goals of the First
Amendment.""'
Commentators discussing mandatory access suggest that some jus-
tification is necessary to force cable operators to set aside channel
capacity for public, educational, government, or commercial ac-
cess. 116 The traditional physical scarcity justification, however, is
tician to respond to criticism broadcaster aired); National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (upheld chain broadcasting regulations).
110. Wardle, supra note 82, at 651.
111. The fairness doctrine, which requires that the targets of political criticism
have reply time, similarly burdens the first amendment rights of the media provider. If
the government forces the provider to give time or space to one user,, the provider can
choose one less user. For that very reason, the doctrine was held unconstitutional as
applied to newspapers. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58
(1974). However, the doctrine was upheld as applied to broadcasters on grounds of phys-
ical scarcity. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 387-93 (1969).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 26-35.
113. Midwest Video Corp. v. F.C.C., 571 F.2d 1025, 1055-56 (8th Cir. 1978),
aff'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Both the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court based their
holdings on the finding that the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the
mandatory access regulations. F.C.C. v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-01
(1979); Midwest Video, 571 F.2d at 1052. However, the Court did not address the con-
stitutionality of mandatory access.
114. Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1401
n.4 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing dismissal of first amendment challenge to city's auctioning
procedure for cable franchise), affid on other grounds, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). The court
refers to sections 611 and 612. These were the original section numbers of section 531
and 532 before the Cable Act's codification.
115. HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4668.
116. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 36 (advocating an expanded scarcity rationale
to justify mandatory access); Note, Access to Cable, Natural Monopoly, and the First
clearly inapplicable to cable."1 Coaxial cables have the technological
capacity to carry many more channels than the airwaves." 8 Failing
in their attempt to apply "strict" physical scarcity analysis to cable,
advocates of mandatory access regulation have attempted to expand
physical scarcity to include the limited capacity on utility poles and
under streets." 9
Another justification for mandatory access is based on the cable
industry's use of public resources. Under this theory, disruption of
public streets, inconvenience to citizens, and the threat to public
safety support regulation.' 20 The use of public resources may justify
some regulation, but only of the installation and maintenance of a
cable system, not the content of the system's programming.' 2' When
the physical scarcity of those resources limits access, regulation to
ensure diverse allocation may be appropriate. However, physical
scarcity, even if applied to cable, cannot justify the content censor-
ship in section 532(h).
5. Economic Scarcity
Some advocates rely on the related theory of economic scarcity to
justify cable regulation.' 22 This theory is based on the assumption
that cable systems constitute a monopoly and are therefore subject to
regulation. This theory is not without its problems. The categoriza-
tion of cable as a natural monopoly market is highly questionable.
123
The economies of scale present in the cable industry do not render
cable systems natural monopolies.' 24 The Cable Act itself provides
Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1663 (1986) (finding mandatory access unconstitutional
based on failure of natural monopoly theory).
117. Some authorities suggest that the scarcity rationale is obsolete even for broad-
casters. See, Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. F.C.C., 768 F.2d 1434, 1449 n.32 (D.C. Cir.
1985); Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx.
L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982).
118. Lee, Cable Leased Access and the Conflict among First Amendment Rights
and First Amendment Values, 35 EMORY L.J. 563, 580 (1986) (quoting Quincy, 768
F.2d at 1448). While Lee places capacity at 200 channels, another authority claims that
cable capacity is "almost infinite." Note, Cable Television and Content Regulation: The
FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 135
(1976).
119. Comment, supra note 36, at 324; Ryerson & Sinel, Regulating Cable Televi-
sion in the 1990s, 17 STETSON L. REV. 607, 633 n.l12 (1988).
120. Comment, supra note 36, at 319 n.67.
121. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449.
122. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 82, at 652-656; Comment, supra note 36, at
325-26.
123. Lee, supra note 118, at 586-91.
124. Id. at 587. Advocates of economic scarcity argue that the fixed installation
costs of a cable system run very high and do not increase substantially with additional
subscribers. Comment, supra note 36, at 325. This is referred to as economies of scale,
where the business cost per customer decreases as the number of customers increases.
These advocates conclude that, because of economies of scale, only one cable company
[VOL. 27: 493. 1990] Censorship of Leased Access Cable
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
for numerous cable franchises in any given area. 125 Furthermore, the
Court expressly rejected economic scarcity as justification for regula-
tion of a newspaper in a "one newspaper town". 26 Thus, economic
scarcity is not a sufficient justification for extending broadcast regu-
lation to cable.
6. Setting the Limit
As the above discussion indicates, the constitutional limit of con-
tent regulation in cable television is not readily apparent. At first
glance, the Pacifica rationales seem applicable to cable television.
Upon further analysis, however, cable is sufficiently distinguishable
from broadcasting to render Pacifica inapplicable to this medium.
Bolger and Sable Communications demonstrate the Court's reluc-
tance to expand upon Pacifica's narrow holding. While this may
change in the future, at present the Miller standard of obscenity
governs the regulation of cable content.'
27
C. Statutory Construction of Section 532(h)
1. Congressional Intent
Although the Cable Act has several other sections which address
offensive programming, section 532(h) is the only section which con-
tains the language, "lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent." The other
sections simply refer to material which is "obscene or otherwise un-
protected by the Constitution."' 28 There are several plausible expla-
nations for the differing language.
First, sections 531 and 532 are the only sections which govern
programing that cable operators have no authority to censor. Section
559 prohibits the transmission over the entire cable system of matter
which is "obscene or . . . otherwise unprotected by the Constitu-
tion." ' 29 Section 544(d)(1) permits the franchising authority and the
can operate "efficiently and profitably" in a community. Id. However, "up to a certain
point in size, every business operates under conditions of decreasing unit cost." J. BON-
BRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 12 (1961) (quoted in Lee, supra note
118, at 587 n.94).
125. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
126. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down
a Florida statute giving political candidates a right to reply to criticism printed in
newspaper).
127. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
128. 47 U.S.C. §§ 559, 544(d)(1) (Supp III 1985).
129. Id. § 559.
cable operator to specify in their franchise agreement that cable ser-
vices which are "obscene or are otherwise unprotected by the Consti-
tution" will be proscribed entirely or provided subject to condi-
tions.' It is entirely possible that Congress intended to give the
franchising authority greater control over content to compensate for
the lack of control allowed the cable operator. However, the goal of
diverse programming, which lies behind leased access, demands less
rather than more censorship. Nevertheless, the additional adjectives
in section 532(h) seem to expand the level of censorship condoned by
the other provisions.
Second, Congress may have intended the Cable Act to consistently
proscribe the same type of matter from all types of channels. Assum-
ing this intent, the addition of "lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent"
in section 532(h) may add nothing to interpretion of the provision.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the Cable Act provides no
explanation for the special language of section 532(h). The discus-
sion of section 532(h) in the legislative history used only "obscene or
otherwise Constitutionally unprotected programming."'31 In addi-
tion, it refers the reader to the discussion of section 544(d) 132 which
explains that Congress used "obscene or . . otherwise unprotected"
to permit "changing constitutional interpretations to be incorporated
into the standard set forth in [544(d)(1)], should those judicial inter-
pretations at some point in the future deem additional standards,
such as indecency, constitutionally valid as applied to cable."1 33
Thus, perhaps the legislature intended, as its history ostensibly indi-
cates, that section 532(h) allow franchising authorities to regulate
only those cable services which are "obscene or otherwise unpro-
130. Id. § 544(d)(1).
131. HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONO. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4692.
Subsection 612(h) [codified as § 532(h)] addresses an issue of particular con-
cern to the Committee-the potential availability of obscene or Constitution-
ally unprotected programming over cable system .... Since leased access
channels are not subject to the editorial control of the operator, the Committee
believed it necessary to assure that the franchising authority have the ability to
restrict the availability of obscene or otherwise unprotected programming over
channels designated for use under this section. Thus, this subsection empowers
franchising authorities to prohibit or condition the provision of cable services
which are obscene or otherwise unprotected by the Constitution.
Id.
132. 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as prohibiting the franchising
authority and a cable operator from specifying, in a franchise or renewal
thereof, that certain cable services shall not be provided or shall be provided
subject to conditions, if such cable services are obscene or are otherwise unpro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States.
Id. This section applies to all cable channels, not only leased access channels.
133. HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 69, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4706.
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tected by the Constitution." However, such a result is disconcerting
given Congress' inclusion of "lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent."
Finally, it is possible that Congress simply borrowed the "obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent" language from other statutes
dealing with offensive material. This does not explain the absence of
the language in sections 544(d)(1) and 559. However, an examina-
tion of the judicial treatment of similarly worded statutes will aid in
interpreting section 532(h).
2. Similarly Worded Statutes
Several statutes which proscribe offensive material use some com-
bination of the words "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, and
filthy" to describe the material in question.3 Traditionally, the
Court has interpreted these statutes to proscribe only obscenity. For
example, in Roth v. United States,135 the Court affirmed a conviction
under 18 U.S.C. section 1461 which prohibits the mailing of
"[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article,
matter, thing, device, or substance."' 36 In its decision, the Court re-
ferred only to "obscenity," defining the term as involving prurient
interests. 37
In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day'38 , the Court reversed a con-
viction under section 1461 for mailing three magazines containing
nude and semi-nude photographs.13 9 While recognizing that the ad-
jectives in question had "different shades of meaning," the Court
noted that the statute's target was "obnoxiously debasing portrayals
of sex.' 40 The Court therefore held that the statute only reached
material which "taken as a whole appeals to the prurient
interest."' 
41
In Hamling v. United States, 42 section 1461 was challenged as
134. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1462, 1465 (1988); 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
135. 354 U.S. 476 (1956) (affirming conviction under § 1461 for mailing obscene
circulars and advertisements).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988).
137. "Prurient" is defined as "arousing or appealing to an obsessive interest in
sex." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 998 (2d college ed. 1982). The term was
adopted by the Court when it set forth its test for obscenity in Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973); see supra note 70.
138. 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
139. Id. at 491.
140. Id. at 483.
141. Id. at 484.
142. 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1973) (affirming conviction under § 1461 for mailing ob-
scene advertising brochures).
being vague and overbroad. The Court dismissed this challenge by
interpreting section 1461 to prohibit only the mailing of "patently
offensive representations or descriptions of that specific 'hard core'
sexual conduct given as examples in Miller v. California.'1 3 The
Court relied heavily on a footnote in United States v. 12 200-ft.
Reels of Film' in which the Court indicated a willingness to con-
strue the same terms used in 19 U.S.C. section 1305(a)'" and in 18
U.S.C. section 1462,146 to mean obscenity if necessary to prevent
vagueness.' Marks v. United States'48 reaffirmed this construction.
It is unclear whether this historical interpretation survives F.C.C.
v. Pacifica Foundation.'49 In Pacifica, the FCC recorded the occur-
rence of the broadcast in the company's file for future reference. The
FCC found authority for this'action in 18 U.S.C. section 1464,
which prohibits the broadcast of "obscene, indecent or profane
language."' 50
Before upholding the FCC's action, the Court discussed whether
the "patently offensive" broadcast "was indecent within the meaning
of [section] 1464."''5 Pacifica agreed that the broadcast was "pa-
tently offensive," but challenged the FCC's definition of "indecent"
because it did not require prurient appeal.I52 Pacifica argued, and
the dissent agreed, that the historical interpretation of "indecent"
implied that the term meant obscene as defined in Miller.'5 3 The
majority disagreed. They distinguished cases construing section
1461, explaining that the provision had a history of concern with the
prurient,15 1 whereas the FCC had long interpreted section 1464 more
broadly.' 55 Furthermore, section 1461 dealt with mailings while sec-
143. Id. at 114 (quoting United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123,
130 n.7 (1973)).
144. 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (remanding conviction under 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) for
importing obscene films, slides, and photographs for application of Miller standard).
145. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1988). The statutes prohibit the importation (sections
1462 & 1305(a)) and interstate transportation (section 1462) of material which section
1305(a) describes as "obscene or immoral" and which section 1462 describes as "ob-
scene, lewd, lascivious, . . . filthy . . . or indecent."
147. 12 200-ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at 130 n.7, construed in Hamling, 418
U.S. at 113-14.
148. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). In Marks, the Court stated that because 18 U.S.C.
1465 used "sweeping language" to describe the forbidden material, it was necessary to
confine the statute's application to the constitutional limits defined by Miller. Id. at 195.
149. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
151. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 740, 777-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 740-41; see also supra text accompanying notes 135-51.
155. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 n.16 (citing Enbano Programming Inquiry, 44
F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960); In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970); In re Sonderling
Broadcasting Corp., 27 R.R.2d 285 (1973), aff'd, 515 F.2d 397 (1974)). In spite of the
Commission's broad interpretation, several courts have construed section 1464 consist-
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tion 1464 regulated broadcasting, which traditionally had been sub-
jected to greater regulation. 56
In essence, the Pacifica Court defined "indecent" and "obscene"
in section 1464 separately because it found that broadcast indecency
could be regulated to the extent the F.C.C. had attempted. On the
other hand, "indecent" in section 1461 had to be synonymous with
obscenity because indecent mail was constitutionally protected. In
other words, regardless of the language used, the Court allowed each
statute to proscribe as much material as the Constitution would
allow.
If applied to section 532(h), this analysis would allow the
franchising authority to prohibit or condition material in three in-
stances. First, the franchising authority would have the power to
censor obscene programming. The franchising authority presently
has such power. Second, if the Court lessens the constitutional pro-
tections of such material on cable, it would be able to constitution-
ally restrict material which is indecent, lewd, lascivious or filthy.
Third, the franchising authority would be able to regulate any mate-
rial not described by the statute which the Court finds "otherwise
unprotected by the Constitution."' 5 7
This approach to 532(h) complies not only with Pacifica but also
with the legislative history behind the section by instantly incorpo-
rating changing constitutional standards. 5 8 However, this construc-
tion illustrates a common problem arising out of judicial reconstruc-
ently with section 1461. In a case cited by Pacifica, the appellate court held that the
conviction under section 1464 should be judged by the Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1956) and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) standards. Illinois Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcast v. F.C.C., 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see supra note
70. In applying the predecessor of section 1464, another court of appeal defined profanity
separately, but reversed the conviction because the language did not "arouse lewd or
lascivious thought." Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 283 U.S. 863 (1931). In Tallman v. United States, the court rejected a vagueness
attack on section 1464 by defining profanity separately and referring to the Roth stan-
dard, which required an appeal to the prurient for obscenity and indecency. 465 F.2d
282, 285-86 (7th Cir. 1972). However, two courts reversed convictions for failure to de-
fine indecency in addition to obscenity in the jury instruction. United States v. Smith,
467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.
1966). Neither court provided a definition of indecency. Nevertheless, upon examination
of this history of section 1464 and the treatment of indecency in United States v. 12 200-
ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973), the Seventh Circuit, equated indecency
to obscenity in section 1464. United States v. Simpson 561 F.2d 53, 59-60 (7th Cir.
1977).
156. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741 & n.16.
157. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985).
158. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
tion of statutes. In attempting to cure overbreadth, courts may
create an equally fatal defect: vagueness.
3. Overbreadth vs. Vagueness
"A law is void on its face if it is so vague that persons 'of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at is meaning and differ as to its
application.' "I" A vague statute raises several concerns. First, such
a statute violates due process by failing to provide citizens fair warn-
ing of its prohibitions. 60 Second, it encourages arbitrary and dis-
criminatory application.' 6' Third, when it regulates a form of expres-
sion, a vague statute may have a "chilling effect," discouraging
constitutionally protected rights.' 2
As discussed earlier, 63 obscenity is the only material completely
without constitutional protection. By ostensibly regulating material
which is "lewd, lascivious, indecent or filthy," in addition to obscen-
ity, section 532(h) and similar statutes "sweep . . . within [their]
ambit" 16 4 protected expression. Thus, the statutes risk being void for
overbreadth. 65 Before Pacifica, the Court consistently saved such
statutes by construing all the adjectives to mean "obscene" as de-
fined by Miller. This approach cured the overbreadth of the statutes
by severing, in one judicial proceeding, the potentially unconstitu-
tional applications. In Pacifica, however, the Court went one step
further. The Court suggested that the meaning of identical terms in
each of these statutes varies with the medium and the current consti-
tutional protection given that medium. In effect, this approach inter-
prets the terms to mean "obscene or otherwise unprotected by the
Constitution" at the present time. 6 6 While this interpretation may
be convenient for Congress, it is inappropriate where the conse-
quence is the suppression of constitutionally protected expression.
One legal scholar'6 7 illustrates the concept of vagueness with the
following hypothetical. Suppose a statute existed which stated: "It
shall be a crime to say anything in public unless the speech is pro-
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments."'"" This statute "is
159. L. TRIBE, supra note 63, at 1033 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
160. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 403 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (upholding control
noise ordinance which sufficiently restricted prohibition to disruption of school activities).
161. Id. at 108-09.
162. Id. at 109.
163. See surpa note 69 and accompanying text.
164. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940); see supra note 60 and accom-
panying text.
165. For a discussion of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra text accompanying
notes 62-68.
166. 47 U.S.C. § 532(h) (Supp. III 1985).
167. L. TRIBE, supra note 63, at 1031.
168. Id.
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guaranteed not to be overbroad since, by its terms, it literally forbids
nothing that the Constitution protects.169 It is "honetheless patently
vague"' 70 because it fails to define what expression is prohibited. The
statute's flaw, and the reason for invalidating it on vagueness
grounds, is that a boundary of constitutional protection requires con-
tinuous refinement. In the interim, protected expression is suppressed
by those unsure of the scope of constitutional protection.
Arguably, the attempt at a constitutional construction of section
532(h) fails because it turns an overbroad statute into a vague
one.171 One way to avoid an invalidation for overbreadth is to return
to precedent and interpret section 532(h) as regulating only obscen-
ity as defined by Miller. In the future, should courts expand upon
Miller to make other types of sexual expression unprotected, Con-
gress could address those concerns at that time. In the interim, sec-
tion 532(h) would unambiguously protect the cable audience from
obscenity. However, this approach strains the limits of judicial con-
struction as noted above.' 72 Construing five adjectives to mean only
one of those words rewrites the statute and is more appropriately left
to Congress.
The alternative is to invalidate section 532(h) entirely. This would
leave obscenity on leased access channels unregulated. Absent a sav-
ing construction, section 532(h) is void for overbreadth if the pro-
tected expression which the statue discourages is a significant part of
its target.'7 3 Potentially offensive cable services which are not ob-
scene constitute a significant part of this provision's target. Legisla-
tive history indicates that Congress intended to provide franchising
authorities with the ability to restrict leased access programming
which is offensive to the community. Moreover, programming which
is deemed offensive by a franchising authority is most likely to be
encountered on an access channel over which the cable operator has
no editorial control.' 74 The purpose behind withdrawing editorial
control from the cable operator on these channels is "tW assure...
the widest possible diversity of information sources"'175 beyond those
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. The vagueness of interpreting section 532(h) to prohibit obscene or otherwise
unprotected leased access programming implies, of course, that sections 559 and
544(d)(1) are also patently vague for their use of the same wording. However, this dis-
cussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
172. See supra note 65-68 and accompanying text.
173. See supra text accompanying note 63.
174. 47 U.S.C. § 532(c)(2) (Supp. III 1985).
175. Id. § 532(a).
which the cable operator would otherwise provide. Given that a sig-
nificant amount of constitutionally protected expression is undoubt-
edly discouraged by section 532(h), the provision must be restric-
tively interpreted to avoid the overbreadth doctrine.
III. PROCEDURAL'DEFECTS OF SECTION 532(H)
Section 532(h) provides that "any [leased access] cable service
. . . shall not be provided, or shall be provided subject to conditions,
if such cable service in the judgment of the franchising authority" is
within the scope specified. This provision has several procedural
flaws which may render the statute unconstitutional.
First, assuming that Pacifica permits some regulation of cable in-
decency, the franchising authority's ability to prohibit or extensively
condition the allegedly indecent programming exceeds Pacifica's
narrow holding. In Pacifica, the FCC did not attempt to ban or con-
dition the program. The Commission merely noted the indecent
broadcasting in Pacifica's file. In finding the FCC action constitu-
tional, the Court emphasized the time of day, the content of the pro-
gram, and the composition of the audience. 1 6 Furthermore, the
Court noted that broadcasting the program during late evening was
not foreclosed. 1 7 The failure to consider these variables and the im-
position of a complete ban rather than a channeling of the material
to other times of the day was the fatal flaw in the cases which lim-
ited Pacifica's reach. 78 In both Sable Communications and Bolger,
the Court found that Pacifica did not justify a complete ban of inde-
cent material. 79 The lower federal courts have reinforced this limi-
tation on Pacifica.18b
In Cruz v. Ferre,'8 ' the court found that the ordinance regulating
indecent as well as obscene cable programming impermissably ex-
ceeded Pacifica by failing to consider the time of day, the context of
the program in which the material appeared, and the composition of
the viewing audience. 82 Similarly, section 532(h) does not require
the franchise authority to consider any of these variables in making
its determination. Therefore, even if a court extends the rationales
for limiting constitutional protection of broadcast indecency to cable,
Pacifica would not permit the franchising authority to prohibit or
176. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1977).
177. Id.
178. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983); Sable Communi-
cations of California, Inc. v. F.C.C., 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989); see supra notes 75-76.
179. Bolger, 463 U.S. 60; Sable Communciations, 109 S. Ct. 2829.
180. See cases cited supra note 78.
181. 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (Miami ordinance regulating indecent and
obscene cable television).
182. Id. at 1422.
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extensively condition the material.18 3
The statute is also procedurally flawed because it does not comply
with the censorship guidelines set forth by the Court. In Freedman v.
Maryland, the Court struck down a state statute requiring the pre-
view of motion pictures by a censorship committee.18 4 In doing so,
the Court recognized that a censor is "less responsive than a
court-part of an independent branch of government-to the consti-
tutionally protected interests in free expression."'8 5 Moreover, if ju-
dicial review is delayed or difficult to obtain, the censor's decision is
final for all practical purposes." 6 The Court held that censorship
could only withstand constitutional scrutiny if the censor had the
burden of proving its constitutionality in an adversary proceeding
before judicial determination. 8 7 Furthermore, the Court required
some assurance that these judicial proceedings would follow within a
brief period specified by the statute or by judicial construction.' 8
When the censor suppresses material before a final judicial determi-
nation (only to "preserve the status quo for the shortest fixed period
compatible with sound judicial resolution"), the procedures must
provide for prompt judicial review of the suppression. 8 9
Section 532(h) provides none of these safeguards "against undue
inhibition of protected expression."' 9 ° When a statute fails to provide
such safeguards, a court may choose to read them into the statute to
preserve its constitutionality.' 9' For example, the Freedman Court
upheld a statute after supplying the missing time limits for prompt
judicial review.' 92 However, the Court refuses or is unable to do so in
183. In 1987, the F.C.C. renewed its battle against indecent radio broadcasts. For
a discussion of the Commission's latest efforts, see Sheehy & Friedner, FCC Intensifies
Its Crackdown on 'Indecent' Radio Broadcasts, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1990, at 15. Cur-
rently, the FCC is compiling a record to support the constitutionality of a 24-hour ban on
indecent broadcasts which the D.C. Circuit stayed in January 1989. Action for Chil-
dren's Television v. F.C.C., No. 88-1916 (D.C. Cir.), discussed in Sheehy & Friedner,
supra, at 16, col. 3.
184. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 (1964).
185. Id. at 57-58.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 58.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 59; see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975) (Freedman procedures required for municipal board prohibiting performance of
musical on city stage); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971)
(Freedman procedures required in seizure by custom agents); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410 (1971) (Freedman procedures required in postal censorship).
190. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 60.
191. See, e.g., id. at 58-59; Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 369.
192. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
some situations. For instance, the Court cannot supply the necessary
safeguards to save a state statute. 193 In addition, while the Court has
the jurisdiction to provide an authoritative construction of a federal
statute, it will not rewrite the statute entirely. 94
In United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Court provided
the time limits during which a censor must seek judicial determina-
tion as required by Freedman.195 However, the Court distinguished
Thirty-Seven Photographs from Blount v. Rizzi' 96 in which the
Court refused to provide the lacking procedural safeguards. While
the statute in Thirty-Seven Photographs 7 complied with Freedman
except for the missing time limits, the statute in Blount' 98 failed to
provide for any judicial review of the obscenity determination.19 9
This distinction also applies to section 532(h). Unlike the statute
in Thirty-Seven Photographs,00 section 532(h) requires no judicial
review whatsoever. Salvation of the provision would therefore require
judicial "relegislation" of the type the Court has been unwilling to
provide. Inasmuch as section 532(h) contains none of the procedural
safeguards mandated by the Court in Freedman, the section cannot
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
In drafting the Cable Act, Congress had noble intentions. Hoping
to expand access to cable television, Congress mandated leased ac-
cess channels for use by programmers unaffiliated with the cable
provider. In addition, Congress limited the cable provider's editorial
control over the content of the leased access programming. Theoreti-
cally, such action should create the "widest possible diversity of in-
formation sources,"201 Congress' express goal. However, in that wide
range of programming, some materials will undoubtedly offend some
viewers. In addressing that concern, Congress enacted section
532(h). The "same Congress which distrusted the editorial judg-
ments of cable publishers entrusted local governments with the
power to decide exceptionally sensitive questions affecting the con-
193. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 369.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 374-75.
196. 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
197. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988). Congress has made some minor revisions to the
statute since 1971. The former version of the statute is quoted by the Court in Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 365.
198. 39 U.S.C. § 4006 (renumbered by Postal Reorganization Act, 85 Stat. 747
(1970) to 39 U.S.C. § 3006).
199. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 367-68.
200. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
201. 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (Supp. III 1985).
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tent offered to cable subscribers. 20 2
In doing so, Congress enacted an overbroad statute which fails to
provide the necessary procedural safeguards. While courts may con-
strue section 532(h) in line with precedent to prohibit only program-
ming described by the Miller standard, the procedural defects are
incurable by judicial construction. The section is therefore unconsti-
tutional and, as such, unenforceable. This will leave obscenity on
leased access channels completely unregulated until Congress enacts
a replacement statute.
If a replacement provision is enacted, unlike current section
532(h), it should not allow the regulation of content which is lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or indecent or is otherwise unprotected by the Con-
stitution. Instead, it should only allow the regulation of obscene ma-
terial which is constitutionally unprotected under Miller. Further-
more, the new statute should provide sufficient procedural safeguards
for constitutionally protected expression. The legislature might look
to the procedures in 19 U.S.C. section 1305(a)20 3 which Thirty-
Seven Photographs implicitly approved. Of course, the legislature
should also specify time limits for judicial determination as required
by Freedman and incorporate the distinguishing aspects of cable
programming.
DEBORAH L. FOWLER
202. Lee, supra note 118, at 595.
203. 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (1988).
Upon the appearance of any such book or matter at any customs office, the
same shall be seized and held by the appropriate customs officer to await the
judgment of the district court as hereinafter provided .... Upon the seizure
of such book or matter such customs officer shall transmit information thereof
to the United States attorney of the district in which is situated the office at
which such seizure has taken place, who shall institute proceedings in the dis-
trict court for the forfeiture, confiscation, and destruction of the book or matter
seized. Upon the adjudication that such book or matter thus seized is of the
character the entry of which is by this section prohibited, it shall be ordered
destroyed and shall be destroyed. Upon adjudication that such book or matter
thus seized is not of the character the entry of which is by this section prohib-
ited, it shall be not be excluded from entry under the provisions of this section.
In any such proceeding any party in interest may upon demand have the
facts at issue determined by a jury and any party may have an appeal or the
right of review as in the case of ordinary actions or suits.
Id.

